Showing posts with label crime. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crime. Show all posts

Sunday, July 21, 2013

Weather and Crime


Newburn’s Criminology is a massive and comprehensive introduction to criminology widely used by and for undergraduates.  It’s over 1,000 pages long, of which the index is nearly 20, and appears to contain no mention of weather.  I know from my wider reading of the history of criminology and of contemporary common-sense criminology that weather has been associated with crime in the past and still.

The Routledge International Handbook of Green Criminology is equally silent on weather but has much to say about climate.  Specifically these two books (Climate Change from a Criminological Perspective Edited by Rob White and Criminological and Legal Consequences of Climate Change Edited by Stephen Farrall, Tawhida Ahmed and Duncan French) take the matter further but make little mention of weather other than as evidence of climate change.

Tom Clarke, Science Editor of Channel 4 News, phoned the other day asking if I could talk about weather and crime and off the top of my head I came up with socio-cultural aspects of our adaptation to hot weather that might increase opportunities for some crimes.  And indeed PC Rain, the copper’s friend.  I was interviewed in the blazing sun outside the Cafe next to ITN’s building in Gray’s Inn Rd for about ten minutes.  What survived is in here.


Tom mentions climate change in the package.  Perhaps he means it in the common sense way of getting hotter rather than the increased instability of the weather.  This is what green criminology talks about.  Crimes caused by changing political economy responding to long term climate change not short run weather.


Thursday, May 23, 2013

The Howard Journal Virtual Reader Volume 4 Research Methods Selected and introduced by me


Go to the Virtual Issues page of the Howard Journal to see articles

This volume is a selection of 18 articles published in the Journal from 2001-2010 that are interesting and valuable in their own right but illustrate practical and theoretical issues around doing research. It is hoped that researchers, whether students, practitioners or experienced academics will find these useful. Not unsurprisingly many of these articles relate to prisons but other elements of the criminal justice system or aspects of crime are considered too. The contents or findings of the research are touched on but here the main concern is the methods chosen and discussion of them. It is slightly artificial but to assist more quickly finding a relevant article they are grouped below as quantitative and qualitative. Additionally the full, and often, self explanatory titles have been bolded and a keyword highlighted. But first some ethical issues and ‘mixed methods’ by way of introduction. 

Introduction: ethics and mixed methods 

Prison is, in many jurisdictions, the most extreme removal of human rights. In England and Wales one ongoing human rights dispute is the extent to which prisoners should have the right to vote (Hirst v the United Kingdom) but the first article presents a more stark affront to a prisoner’s human rights. 

Geraint Osborne examines ‘Scientific Experimentation on Canadian Inmates, 1955 to 1975’. Once it was established that prisoner’s claims to have been experimented on were true it was the ethical issues that came to the fore. It is this ethical issue that means this article is put first. 

The psychologists and pharmacologists and their backers decided that their research was justified by the context of the time. The research/human-rights-breach/abuse comprised: sensory deprivation, electric shock ‘therapies’, extreme cold, tranquiliser and LSD prescription, toxicity and allergy tests. All with ethical approval at the time and sometimes the ‘consent’ of the prisoner. Results were often mixed and rarely or poorly written up. The article usefully runs us through the history of modern ethical concerns, the Nuremberg Code and Helsinki Declaration - the final draft of which omitted a specific ban on the use of prisoners. 

The methodologies war may have died down but there are still cultural, political and attitudinal disagreements over methods. Some now seek to avoid these issues by opting for ‘mixed-methods’. The majority of these articles use single methods but often refer to others or follow on from other research. However the work of Samantha Banbury is considered next as she uses a variety of methods and also addresses the ethical issues raised by her own research and that of others. 

The Howard League have, at the time of writing, announced their intention to research sex in prison: consensual sex in prisons; coercive sex in prisons and healthy sexual development among young people in prison. Banbury’s article concentrates on, ‘Coercive Sexual Behaviour in British Prisons as Reported by Adult Ex-Prisoners’ but also reports to occurrence of consensual sex. She used both one-to-one interviews (106) and self-completed questionnaires (302) elicited by adverts in the personal columns of mainstream and alternative press. Ethical issues and absence of official assistance lead to the use of ex-offenders. Differences in the actual content of adverts (describing or not describing the purpose of the study) lead to some respondents being tagged as ‘victims’ (200) and the rest as ‘participants’ (208). ‘Victims’ were more likely to report concerns and a history of victimisation but ‘participants’ were far from immune. Some ‘victims’ reported being perpetrators. The self selected nature of the samples and raft of disaggregated data means it is difficult to draw conclusions but the sheer quantity of material and some of the qualitative observations make it a good place to start. 
We turn now to quantitative methods. 

Quantitative 

It might be said that the sine qua non of quantitative methods is the survey. In ‘The Performance of Volunteer Appropriate Adults: A Survey of Call Outs’ Harriet Pierpoint sets out why and how she did her survey in a very clear fashion relating it to the methodological literature and her own critical reflection. In her conclusion she supports the method chosen but examines participant observation and the use of a police interview simulation video. Importantly she recognises that the survey method allowed her to find the proportion of volunteer appropriate adults who contributed or did not contribute during an interview but not how appropriate that was.

Lorraine Sheridan et al in ‘The Course and Nature of Stalking: A Victim Perspective’ also use a survey but not of their own. The sample and 46 item questionnaire was provided by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust of 95 individuals who had approached the Charity about being stalked. Necessarily their methods discussion is much shorter and its limitations noted. As the first survey just after the change in the law in E&W on stalking it has some value but other methods and researcher controlled data would be better. 

If surveys are the typical of the quantitative method then surveys of public opinion are the archetype. They are the method most often used by and in the media to tell ‘us’ about ‘ourselves’ and in ‘Individual Differences in Public Opinion about Youth Crime and Justice in Swansea’ Kevin Haines and Stephen Case found, ‘local public opinion is shaped by national media and political rhetoric, rather than the local realities of youth offending.’ Their survey asked 500 people 18-64, and an impressive (even for an opportunity sample) 496 replied, about youth crime in Swansea. They set out a methodology and justification and even include some of their questions and helpfully review some of the literature on such surveys including the British Crime Survey. 
We now turn to the variety of qualitative work - often forms of interviews but also observation, documents and focus groups. As we shall see ethical issues continue to feature. 

Qualitative 

Whilst it is a qualitative piece of work Cowburn’s ‘Men Researching Men in Prison: The Challenges for Profeminist Research’ raises many theoretical and practical issues that arise in research. Nine men imprisoned for sex offences told him their life histories in semi-structured interviews based around life transitions. They were serving sentences of between four and ten years. Six had offended against children and three against adults. Only one had previous convictions for sexual offences. All of the men were white and aged between 25 and 61. The interviews lasted between four and seven hours in total. Running through epistemology and feminist interventions he interrogates his own position as white male researcher and concludes, perhaps in hope, ‘To listen, to record and, in publication, to critique dominant male practices from a clear and explicit standpoint, may be a positive way forward for further research’ (2007: 287). 

Nowhere is such a challenge greater than in work with sex offenders and Nicholas Blagden and Sarah Pemberton cite Cowburn in ‘The Challenge in Conducting Qualitative Research With Convicted Sex Offenders’. They examine the recruitment of participants, informed consent, establishing researcher-participant rapport, avoiding collusion and ensuring confidentiality and anonymity and reflect on the social, political and ethical-legal dilemmas, as well as the emotional aspects (both for the researcher and participant) of researching such populations. For instance: in one interview the participant was recalling his account of the offence and he offered the justification that the offence was not rape, but ‘rough sex’. This was followed by the disclaimer: ‘all men like rough sex’ and then the tag question: ‘you can’t tell me you don’t like rough sex? Come on be honest’. This was an uncomfortable moment and one where the male researcher’s values were the object of the interview. (2010: 273) 

Cowburn was considering the issue of gender in a single sex situation. Clare Byrne and Karen Trew’s ‘Pathways Through Crime: 
The Development of Crime and Desistance in the Accounts of Men and Women Offenders’ directly compares nine male and nine female offenders accounts of their lives and offending and specifically addresses gender. Semi-structured interviews were supplemented with access to official records as all were attending offending behaviour programmes run by the Probation Board for Northern Ireland. 

But as with much qualitative work some rigorous and sometimes quantitatively oriented methods may be required. As they say: 
Interview data were analysed in detail through processes of: categorisation (clustering and describing like units of data); conceptual analysis (exploring links between categories to develop abstract concepts); relating emerging concepts to existing theories; and ultimately generating a ‘theory’ of offending grounded in the interview data. In order to explore gender during this process, data from men’s and women’s accounts were analysed independently and then in light of one another, then in light of existing theoretical frameworks. (2008: 241) 
Gwyneth Boswell’s research for ‘Imprisoned Fathers: The Children’s View’ involved interviews with fathers in prison, partners in the community and staff at prisons but crucially with 17 children. The data on the 209 families involved showed 424 children under 18. Through the mother/carer 25 were approached and 17 agreed to be interviewed. A further 8 wee partially interviewed as part of the mother’s interview. No claim is made that this is representative of the sample. It included only one black child and no children on YOI fathers. The intention was to give the children a ‘voice’ within the wider research. On the ethical front; it was already clear to the child that the father was in prison, indeed half of the interviews occurred in prison visit centres and they were accompanied by their mother. The article then provides many quotes from the children on various aspects of their experience of having a father in prison. 

And it is with ‘voice’ we stay This time listening to very persistent young adult offenders. The in-depth interviews in Wing Hong Chui, Bill Tupman and Colin Farlow’s ‘Listening to Young Adult Offenders: Views on the Effect of a Police-Probation Initiative on Reducing Crime’ include offenders’ attitudes to offending, self-explanations for their criminality, views of peer associations and the usefulness of the Project ARC intervention. The eleven offenders’ first hand accounts also offer insight to the police and probation services on how the project can and should be further improved in order to reform their offending behaviours. 

Ros Burnett and Shadd Maruna's ‘So ‘Prison Works’, Does It? The Criminal Careers of 130 Men Released from Prison under Home Secretary, Michael Howard’ is a rich analysis in its own right and reanalysis of Burnett's earlier work , ‘The Dynamics of Recidivism’. It is also a case study in what can happen to your research as it was (mis)used by Michael Howard. They reanalysed her prospective work and then followed up the offenders she had interviewed ten years earlier. They found that offenders often had a good appreciation of the challenges facing them and their chances of ‘going straight’ - or desisting in the terminology. It was ‘hope’ not prison that worked. 

Better known for their ethnographic work, Geoffrey Pearson and Dick Hobbs, offer interviews with ‘middle market’ (the which definition they discuss) illegal drug dealer/distributors and enforcement personnel to provide a case study of one network. In ‘King Pin? A Case Study of a Middle Market Drug Broker’ they also reveal the ‘glocal’ nature of such networks and even cooperative and trust-based actions and not the early resort to violence that might be expected. Pearson and Hobbs note the prevalence of studies of drug consumption and the rarity of those on drug supply. 

Our next article is one of those rare ones and cites Pearson and Hobbs. The work that Ben Crewe did for ‘Prison Drug Dealing and the Ethnographic Lens’ was at a medium-security men’s prison. Prison ethnographies are rare but have, ‘formed the cornerstone of the field’ (2006: 347) and this one examines the part played by heroin in the internal economy. The method of ‘reserved participation’ and long interviews provided a case study of three dealers. In addition to setting out his method and findings Ben discusses the value of ethnography and reasons for its decline in criminology in the face of quantitative penology. He also addresses the difficulties that some researchers face in setting up such research - having a good sponsor helps. 

Far from prison but equally constrained we find South Asian women experiencing domestic violence. Aisha Gill’s ‘Voicing the Silent Fear: South Asian Women’s Experiences of Domestic Violence’ allows 18 women to ‘speak’ through interview about ‘honour’, ‘shame’ and domestic violence at the hands of husbands and mothers-in-law. The women were contacted through refuges and she sets out the methods and efforts to prevent the process becoming one-sided. 

Gill’s women were hidden in many ways but Elaine Crawley and Richard Sparks find a different and unexpected ‘injured’ group, older men convicted of imprisonment which they describe in, ‘Hidden Injuries? Researching the Experiences of Older Men in English Prisons’. In this they consciously follow Sennett and Cobb’s ((1993) [1972] The Hidden Injuries of Class, New York: Norton.) emphasis on a biographical understanding of structural people’s positions. They breezily observe, ‘The simple fieldwork tasks that we dignify with the name of ‘method’ were as follows: 
(i) Observation (...) 
(ii) Prisoner interviews (80 in depth ...) 
(iii) Staff interviews (11 one hour interviews ...) 

A further ethical note is provided in their endnotes when they reveal that one prisoner respondent asked that his tape only be listened to by the team (so not by an outside transcriber) because he had discussed his suicidal thoughts and another feared he might be identified. 

The biographies in Crawley and Sparks were taken in interview but Mike Nellis argues for the use of already existing written ones. In ‘Prose and Cons: Offender Auto/Biographies, Penal Reform and Probation Training’ he argues that the few uses of such materials should be extended to the training probation officers. Whilst this work is now 10 years old it contains good starting points for research into the lives of prisoners through their auto/biographies. And Tracy Irwin adds her own experience of teaching in Maghaberry Prison in ‘The ‘Inside’ Story: Practitioner Perspectives on Teaching in Prison’. 

Many of these qualitative articles have used interviews as part of their research armoury, Sarah Miller, Carly Sees and Jennifer Brown introduce us to focus groups as a method in their ‘Key Aspects of Psychological Change in Residents of a Prison Therapeutic Community: A Focus Group Approach’. As they say in their abstract, ‘In an attempt to gain a person-centred perspective of therapeutic change, exploratory focus groups were conducted with men in Dovegate Prison’s Therapeutic Community (TC)’. They set out: the design (four focus groups with 27 men encouraged to see themselves as co-researchers); sample (resident in the TC between 1 and 18 months an aged 22 to 57); procedure (2 researchers low involvement facilitator and note taker with a wide and deep topic range attending to specific and contextual factors) and analytical (searching for meaningful themes across and not within the group). They report that Dovegate’s resident found the method a good one to discuss their experiences. 

Conclusion 

These articles offer a wide variety of methods and a wide variety of engagement with methods. Whilst not selected by using quantitative means we might conclude that qualitative methods have been the preferred method in research published by the Howard Journal. This represents no bias at the journal but might in its potential contributors. 

Sunday, May 12, 2013

British Society of Criminology Brian Williams Prize Shortlist 2013


The Brian Williams Prize was established to honour the memory of Dr. Brian Williams, who was Professor of Community Justice and Victimology at De Montfort University, and who died tragically in 2007.  The prize reflects the desire of the British Society of Criminology to encourage and recognise the achievements of new members of the criminology profession, and is awarded to the author of a criminological article, who is a “new” scholar, published in a refereed academic journal.
Here is the short list.


This article analyses the recent expansion of immigration offences in Britain. Drawing on criminal law scholarship, it considers the reasons for relying on the criminal law in immigration enforcement. On the one hand, criminal law is used symbolically. In this view, the creation of criminal offences may be read as an attempt to appease a sector of the electorate, the media and the Opposition about the ‘immigration problem.’ By introducing these offences, the government sent a message that the situation is under control. On the other hand, the criminal law serves regulatory functions, offering the UK Border Agency a range of options for dealing with unwanted immigrants. In practice, most immigration offences are rarely enforced. Instead, the criminal law often seems to primarily work as a threat, relied on to enforce compliance with immigration rules. A criminal prosecution is reserved for those foreigners for whom the primary sanction
–expulsion- cannot be carried out. In these cases, a criminal prosecution and conviction facilitate administrative proceedings leading to removal. Given that the criminalization of immigration breaches is in stark contrast with a number of criminal law principles, this paper argues that the normative justification of criminal law in immigration matters is
weak and it should have no role to play in the enforcement of immigration rules.

Ron Dudai ‘INFORMERS AND THE TRANSITION IN NORTHERN IRELAND’ BRIT. J. CRIMINOL (2012) 52, 32–54


Though criminological literature has paid attention to the use of informers in ordinary law enforcement, there is a research gap regarding their usage in contexts of conflict and political violence. This article explores the social, political and security functions of IRA informers in the transition from conflict in Northern Ireland. Based on that experience, it develops four heuristic models regarding informers that the paper argues may be of direct relevance to other conflicted and transitional societies. These are the informer as folk devil, the informer as rumour, the informer as political manipulator, and the informer as celebrity. All these themes demonstrate the long-term effects of the use of informers during the Northern Ireland conflict—an important finding given the increasing prevalence of the use of informers in a political context.


This article examines the role of female police officers within the context of developing ‘soft’ policing initiatives designed to divert young people away from crime. Within the police culture literature, a masculine model of policing associated with coercive crime fighting tasks is often contrasted with a more cooperative, problem-solving and compassionate mode of police work. The latter model is viewed as serving to create a more legitimate structure for female police officers to work within, involving increasing trust and cooperation in communities and engaging with community crime prevention strategies. The aim of this article is to assess the role of female police officers within recent changes under the auspices of community policing reform in England and Wales, highlighting the role of female officers in enacting ‘soft’ policing initiatives in collaboration with social work and other community agencies. This raises some limitations of the conventional police culture literature by illustrating the ways these operations have carved a niche for female officers, in addition to altering the style of policing across certain sections of the organisation more generally.



Drawing upon semi-ethnographic research, this article explores desistance in process among serious offenders residing in democratic therapeutic communities. It is argued that offender rehabilitation in therapeutic communities involves a process of purposive and agentic reconstruction of identity and narrative reframing, so that a ‘new’ and ‘better’ person emerges whose attitudes and behaviours cohere with long-term desistance from crime. This is possible because the prison-based therapeutic community, with its commitment to a radically ‘different’ culture and mode of rehabilitation, socially enables, produces and reinforces the emergence of someone ‘different’. The article therefore develops existing understandings of change in forensic therapeutic communities, and reaffirms theories of desistance which emphasize the importance of pro-social changes to the offender’s personal identity and self-narrative.

Sunday, April 28, 2013

Public criminology, Raoul Moat and ‘the perfect crime story’


There is clearly some argument about what public criminology is and some of this might turn on the precise definition of democratic underlabouring.  Here Elizabeth Turner of Liverpool Univeristiy responds to recent guest post by David Wilson.

Professor David Wilson’s April 18th guest post on this blog made a number of criticisms of three recent peer-reviewed articles published in the British Journal of Criminology (Turner, 2013) and in Crime, Media and Culture (Ellis, Sloan and Wykes, 2013; Rowe, 2013). Wilson’s frustration with these three articles appears to stem from the fact that they each in their own way criticise, conflict with or neglect his own work as the most frequently quoted ‘public criminologist’ in the UK (Wilson, 2011: xvi). In this post I want to respond to Wilson’s assessment of the contribution made by these three pieces of peer-reviewed academic work, by examining the concerns he expresses against the backdrop of the wider debate about ‘public criminology’.

Wilson defines a ‘public criminologist’ as ‘an academic criminologist who, while teaching, writing and researching at a university, also engages in popular debates in the print and broadcast media about crime and punishment’ (Wilson, 2013a). For me this definition is what I have described elsewhere as theoretically ‘empty’: it provides no normative justification as to why criminologists engaging with the media should necessarily be considered to be a desirable thing. The idea that ‘public criminology’ merely means criminologists gaining media exposure in order to say things about crime rests upon a number of assumptions which I think need to be interrogated. Indeed, examining the assumptions underpinning recent discussions of criminology’s public role is what I set out to do in the journal article which Wilson criticises (see Turner, 2013).     

Wilson’s main criticism of my article seems to be that it merely reinforces what he sees as a dominant tendency amongst academic criminologists to shun the kind of active engagement with the media that he himself has adopted. In Wilson’s view the criminological field is overpopulated with individuals happy to accept a modest role as ‘democratic underlabourers’ (see Loader and Sparks, 2010) rather than engaging in ‘newsmaking’ (see Barak, 1988) or what Wilson (2013b) calls ‘viewsmaking’, criminology.  Wilson suggests that my article is aligned with Loader and Sparks’s (2010) notion of ‘democratic underlabouring’ and that I unfairly dismiss the ‘newsmaking’ perspective without providing adequate evidence or quoting from some key recent texts in this area (including Wilson’s own work).  

The first point I would make in response to this is that I don’t think Wilson accurately represents Loader and Sparks’s (2010) idea of the ‘democratic underlabourer’. The ‘democratic underlabourer’ Loader and Sparks describe is not, as Wilson suggests, simply a criminologist doing what criminologists already do [1]. As such I think for Wilson to say there are too many ‘democratic underlabourers’ is inaccurate. To be fair I think what he meant was that too many criminologists are wholly concerned with producing knowledge which they communicate in ways that are utterly incomprehensible to the proverbial ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ and that they devote too little time to finding ways to make their knowledge accessible such that it can make a constructive contribution to public discourse. This may be an accurate point. However it is not the same as saying there are too many of Loader and Sparks’s ‘democratic underlabourers’ amongst the ranks of academic criminologists.   

As regards Wilson’s suggestion that I myself am ‘aligned’ with the democratic underlabouring perspective there is some truth in this. As I make clear in my article I think that, to date, Loader and Sparks have made the most theoretically sophisticated and democratically committed attempt to grapple with what it means for criminology to go ‘public’. I also concur with their suggestion that if criminology is to have a more prominent public role, that that role must be subordinate to the primacy of democratic values in the political sphere. ‘Expert knowledge’ might help to improve political deliberation but it cannot and should not replace it (a position I imagine Wilson also supports). Furthermore Loader and Sparks rightly identify and attempt to accommodate within their ideas the plural and disputatious nature of criminology, something which I think it is important to acknowledge if a satisfactory account of criminology’s public role is to be provided. So broadly speaking, yes, I am aligned with the notion that criminology’s public role must be democratically defensible [2].

In order to consider whether, as Wilson alleges, I unfairly dismiss the ‘newsmaking’ approach (and thus his work) without acknowledging its achievements, it is important to revisit what my article sought to do. The purpose of the article was to consider the ways in which criminologists have reflected upon the appropriate public role for their field and to interrogate the justifications which they have provided (or failed to provide) for their right to play any public role [3]. The ins and outs of doing ‘public criminology’, and the impact made by those who do it, were never my primary focus. It is clearly a fact that some criminologists have rolled up their sleeves and embraced the difficult task of translating academic research for mass mediated dissemination and I never set out to claim otherwise.

However, what I do say in the article is that as some criminologists (Wilson included) are frequently and publicly enthusing about the advantages of ‘public criminology’ (confusingly sometimes also referred to as ‘newsmaking criminology’ and ‘viewsmaking criminology’) it is worth taking some time to think about why and how academic criminologists should contribute to public life and under what conditions. So, reflecting on that particular issue, rather than providing an inventory of public criminology’s achievements, was always the focus for the article. As such, when I describe ‘newsmaking criminology’ as ‘appear[ing] to empty criminology of any meaningful content so that all that matters is getting one’s own favoured discourse heard’ (Turner, 2013) I do not mean that self-identified ‘newsmaking’ criminologists have not contributed to public debates in influential, perhaps even desirable, ways. What I mean is merely that they have done so in the absence of a satisfactory normative account of why their particular ‘criminological’ discourses should receive media exposure in preference to any other ‘criminological’, or indeed non-‘criminological’, discourses on crime. As such, I would dispute Wilson’s claim that I ‘airily dismiss’ the ‘newsmaking’ criminologists and suggest that, rather, what I do is to suggest that we might put their achievements on a firmer footing within the academy by providing a robust, democratically-defensible and theoretically-engaged account of their public value. 

Still, in the absence of any explicit exposition on the value of criminologists’s contributions in the mass media, it is possible to consider what some recent examples of ‘public criminology’ in action might tell us about the potential that such activity has to enhance public life. Wilson himself has suggested that some key benefits which might be achieved through ‘public criminology’ are: (1) public education; (2) putting crime issues into a ‘broader context’, recognising complexity and grey areas; and (3) exerting a ‘cooling’ influence on what is often a heated topic of public debate. But, as Wilson and Groombridge (2010) and Rowe (2013) point out, public criminologists oriented to these objectives will inevitably experience significant ‘tension’ when attempting to pursue them through the media as core media agendas and priorities will often clash with those of the public academic. Indeed, Rowe suggests that whilst the possibilities for criminologists to contribute to media coverage are expanding so too are the risks of ‘misrepresentation, simplification or marginalization of perspectives that seek to challenge dominant narratives of crime and responses to it’. These risks create the danger that criminologists will retreat from engagement with the media, leaving a void which less-informed others will be only too happy to fill (Rowe, 2013: 13). 

In his blog post Wilson (2013b) objects to this aspect of Rowe’s analysis, asserting that Rowe ‘lags behind’ the small number of criminologists ‘who are already aware of that framing, written about it and are trying to use that awareness to promote a better public understanding of crimes and punishments’.  Wilson goes on to state that his own awareness of how media framing works, and of the need to reach out to wider, and potentially more challenging, audiences is behind his success as a contributor to the Daily Mail writing, amongst other things, about the Raoul Moat case. Wilson describes this case as providing a ‘perfect example of the various, tensions, opportunities and dangers that exist for the public, newsmaking Criminologist’. In contrast with Rowe (who suggests that the kind of ‘rolling-news’ coverage which is provided in relation to extreme events such as the Raoul Moat manhunt, provides limited opportunities for meaningful criminological contributions) Wilson looks back on his involvement in the media coverage of the Moat case as a positive example of what public criminologists can achieve. In his own assessment of his work Wilson claims that his contributions to the Daily Mail were ‘perfectly framed’ for the paper and yet also offered an argument to which Mail readers would not usually be exposed. 

However, and as Wilson notes, other writers have offered rather less flattering assessments of his Daily Mail contributions. Well-known blogger, author and columnist Owen Jones accuses him of ‘class hatred’, and of reducing the white working class to the status of ‘knuckle-dragging thugs lacking legitimate aspirations’ (Jones, 2011: 6 cited by Wilson, 2013b). Ellis et al (2013) suggest that he draws on ‘established discourses of individual psychopathology’ and fails to consider the powerful impact of media and other public discourses in constituting, making available and reinforcing a hegemonic version of masculine identity which is heavily invested in violence. Wilson’s response is to argue that neither Jones, nor Ellis et al, properly acknowledge his article’s foregrounding of a range of issues including domestic abuse, misogyny and the impact of deindustrialization on men in Northern England. He also suggests that the term ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is unlikely ever to appear in the Daily Mail. He is probably right on the latter point, but does that mean that the concerns expressed by Jones (2011) and Ellis et al (2013) and the cautionary notes sounded by Rowe (2013) can be so easily discounted?    

Well, if we examine the content of Wilson’s articles then I think there is reason to suggest that Wilson has somewhat blithely dismissed the concerns of his critics, rather than engaging with them in a constructive fashion. Jones (2011) seems to have a point in his suggestion that Wilson invokes the image of the white, working class as relatively unevolved (‘knuckle-dragging’). Writing in the Daily Mail in July 2010 Wilson explicitly likened the women posting pro-Moat messages on Facebook as reflective of the historical tendency for women to be attracted to ‘large, tough, violent’ men, and suggested that they were displaying values compatible with an earlier stage in the ‘evolutionary development of mankind’. 

Furthermore, whilst Wilson did indeed draw his readers’ attention to Moat’s misogynistic attitudes and history of domestic abuse, as well as to the wider issues associated with deindustrialization in the North of England, it is important to consider how he ‘framed’ these issues. For example, in referring to the expressions of support for Moat as ‘a howl of rage from some of the Northern, dispossessed, white working-class who feel, however unjustifiably, they have been neglected by the sweeping social forces changing modern Britain’, in my view, Wilson gave with one hand and stabbed in the back with the other. Moat’s supporters were made out to be emblematic of the whole white Northern working-class; the working-class were portrayed as ‘howling’ like toddlers, or animals; they were said to ‘dispossessed’ but their perception of neglect was ‘unjustifiable’; they were negatively affected by change, but that change was a ‘sweeping force’ seemingly disconnected from human agency. 

Throughout the two articles on Moat which Wilson wrote for the paper (Wilson 2010a; 2010b) familiar, and sociologically unenlightening, Daily Mail staples like ‘welfare dependency’ and ‘underclass’ were rolled out, alongside emotive phrases like ‘dark forces’, ‘twisted mindset’ and ‘grotesque narrative’ which are difficult to read out loud without one’s face being forced into a kind of sneer. At one point Wilson seemed to imply that only it was unemployed people whose lives lack ‘work or stimulus’who were sucked into watching the real-life soap opera of the Moat manhunt unfold, as if the eyes of a nation weren’t glued to the saga at the time. And always in the background of these articles there lurks a low but constant note of othering, occasionally made explicit (such as when he refers to ‘an amorality that exists in our midst’). The plain implication appears to be that misogyny, domestic abuse, violence and deindustrialization are their problems, not ours. One might ask, then, whether there is any point in Wilson drawing attention to these factors, if it is only to locate them squarely in the lives of the allegedly morally degenerate ‘others’ whose lives he purports to describe [4]? 

As Ellis et al (2013) observe the Raoul Moat drama may have been ‘the perfect crime story’. Wilson’s framing makes it just so, if one happens to subscribe to the worldview of the Daily Mail that is. And here lies the problem for Wilson’s self-proclaimed mastery of ‘perfect’ framing: so adept has he proven at adapting to the Daily Mail’s ‘house style’ that he appears to have forgotten that often it is not just what you say but the way that you say it that leaves an imprint on people’s minds. 

It would seem, then, that Rowe (2013) was quite right to emphasise that there are very real ‘risks’ when criminologists seek to engage with the media. However, Rowe does not mention what may be the greatest risk of all: not that the media will misrepresent what criminologists say, but that criminologists themselves will misrepresent what criminology is. The lure of media relevance and interest may lead us towards certain topics, as well as certain ways of ‘framing’ them. But a line needs to be drawn between making knowledge widely accessible and making it easily acceptable (if all sociological knowledge were readily acceptable into common-sense then there would be little point in us doing research). 

I certainly applaud Professor Wilson, and indeed other criminologists, who seek to find novel and effective ways to enlighten the British public about issues of crime and justice falling within their own areas of expertise and interest. However, I am concerned that in his blog post Wilson (2013b) has been a little too quick to dismiss those who sound more cautionary notes, who seek to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the practical enterprise he is engaged in, or who point out the potential unintended consequences of his media engagements. One such unintended consequence may be that most of the criminology which goes ‘public’ is representative of only a narrow segment of criminological work: that which feeds into and reinforces common-sense understandings of crime and how we should approach the matter of its control, whilst neglecting more critical perspectives which seek to situate ‘crime’ in relation to a much wider range of social harms [5]. For me, it seems likely that such a development will be to the detriment of high quality democratic dialogue. In the end, then, unless self-proclaimed ‘public criminologists’ can give a coherent account of how their approach to media engagement enhances the health of our democracy, then, for me at least, one question looms large: precisely which ‘public’ is ‘public criminology’ for?   

References

Barak, G (1988) 'Newsmaking Criminology: Reflections on the Media, Intellectuals and Crime' in Justice Quarterly 5 (4) pp. 565-585

Ellis, A; Sloan, J and Wykes, M (2013) ‘ “Moatifs” of masculinity: The stories told about “men” in British newspaper coverage of the Raoul Moat case’ in Crime, Media, Culture 9(1): 3-21

Jones, O (2011) Chavs: The Demonisation of the Working Class, (London: Verso Books)

Loader, I and Sparks, R (2010) Public Criminology? (London: Routledge)

Rowe, M (2013) ‘Just like a TV show: Public criminology and the media coverage of “hunt for Britain’s most wanted man”’ Crime, Media, Culture 9(1): 23-38

Turner, E (2013) ‘Beyond “facts” and “values”: Rethinking some recent debates about the public role of criminology’ in British Journal of Criminology 53 (1): 149-166

Wilson, D (2010a) ‘A howl of rage from a bitter and deluded underclass’ in Daily Mail 16 July 2010 View at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1295161/Raoul-Moat-Facebook-tributes-A-howl-rage-bitter-deluded-underclass.html (Last accessed: 27/04/13) 

Wilson, D (2010b) ‘Violent narcissist who thought he was Rambo’ in Daily Mail 12 July 2010 View at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1293954/Raoul-Moat-Violent-narcissist-thought-Rambo.html (Last accessed 27/04/13)

Wilson, D (2011) Looking for Laura: Public Criminology and Hot News (Hook: Waterside Press)

Wilson, D (2013a) ‘The TV academic: balancing the demands of a double career’ Guardian Professional. View at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/higher-education-network/blog/2013/mar/28/tv-academic-celebrity-media-career (Last accessed 27/04/13)

Wilson, D (2013b) ‘Raoul Moat and Public Criminology’ Blog post. View at: http://criminologyinpublic.blogspot.co.uk/ (Last accessed 27/04/13)

Wilson, D and Groombridge, N (2010), “’I’m Making a TV Programme Here!: Reality TV’s Banged Up and Public Criminology,” The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 49 (1): 1-17

Notes

[1] Perhaps, Loader and Sparks have not helped matters here because they somewhat confusingly refer to both a broad sensibility of ‘democratic underlabouring’ and the specific figure of the ‘democratic underlabourer’. However, a careful reading of their text reveals that the ‘democratic underlabourer’ is a criminologist with a particular orientation towards what we might think of as intellectual diplomacy. She attempts to support the productive coexistence of different modes of criminological knowledge production and their collective interaction with the wider public sphere in such a way as to support a ‘better politics’ of crime, crime control and criminal justice. This is not the daily bread and butter work of most criminologists who are, I think it is fair to say, primarily concerned with producing knowledge, rather than with undertaking intellectual diplomacy

[2] Where I part company with Loader and Sparks is over their rather optimistic assessment of the prospects for their conception of democratic underlabouring to facilitate (i) peaceful coexistence between starkly different approaches to thinking about and researching crime and (ii) a ‘better politics’ of crime, crime control and criminal justice. I suggest that democratic values occupy a precarious position in the contemporary public sphere, and that our politics are all too vulnerable to domination by particular interest groups and certain narrow ways of knowing about the world. In this public sphere inconvenient conclusions can be buried, alternative perspectives crowded out and research agendas skewed.  Under these conditions, my article asks, what hope is there for the ‘better politics’ which Loader and Sparks rightly desire?  

[3] The article approaches this task by describing and examining three perspectives on criminology’s public role which I believe can be discerned in the existing literature: (1)  ‘Fighting for truth’ – (see Currie, 2007) criminologists should use impartial scientific methods to identify objective, value-free ‘truths’ about crime and then disseminate these perspectives widely and assertively; (2) ‘Newsmaking criminology’ (see Barak, 1988)  – criminologists should develop a strategic approach to working with the media in order to ensure alternative ‘discourses’ on crime and justice are heard (3) ‘Democratic underlabouring’ (see Loader and Sparks, 2010) – criminologists produce knowledge in three modes – Primary, Institutional-Critical and Normative – some criminologists should work as ‘democratic underlabourers’ or ‘diplomats’ helping to interpret and negotiate between different modes of criminological knowledge and the wider public sphere in order to bring knowledge to bear on ‘matters of public concern and dispute’ and thus help to bring about a ‘better politics’ of crime and justice. Ultimately I argue that none of these perspectives is entirely satisfactory, because none of them offers a plausible and democratically-defensible response to either the manifest pluralism of the criminological field, or the wider political context within which a variety of ‘facts’ about crime jostle for position in a public sphere prone to dominating influences.

[4] It is worth adding here that I think it is fair to suggest that Wilson’s implication that the by-lines assigned to both of his Moat articles in the Mail were misleading is somewhat disingenuous. Both by-lines use phrases which are completely reflective of the language used in Wilson’s articles. No ‘sub-editor’ can be blamed for this; the by-lines are not false advertising for the content which follows.

[5] Take Wilson’s most recent foray into TV documentary: ‘Killers Behind Bars’. From the title, to the description of the academic front man as a ‘real life “Cracker”’ to the bizarre CSI-style trailer which sees Professor Wilson walk through a mock-up murder scene and spray an unidentified substance onto a brick wall, this programme has clearly been designed to, as Wilson himself says, harness ‘the public’s fascination with murder’. But, apart from the fact that the presenter is a criminologist, what has this kind of CSI-framed, cold-case research got to do with what most criminologists do? The answer, as I am sure Wilson is well-aware, is very little.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

Theocratic Criminology


If I were a Saudi-based criminologist how would I deal with a request from the authorities to investigate why women wanted to commit the crime of driving or anyone the crime of alcohol production, distribution and sale?  As a UK-based criminologist I can select from, or mix up, the whole smorgasbord of criminological history in attempting to explain crime or, in this Saudi example, criminalisation.  But what of a Saudi criminologist?

Women driving or pretty much anything to do with alcohol are crimes in Saudi Arabia but not in many other places; and I use such facts in my criminology teaching.  That is I attempt to show my students that law and morals have changed over time and between places and therefore that crime and deviance is relative.

I have often tossed such ‘facts’ into lectures without too much thought.  Whilst areligious I teach at a Roman Catholic University College.  I often spend time early in my introductory criminology module on the pre-history of criminology when crime and sin were undivided and indivisible and you only needed religious authority to know what was right and wrong and why.

The theological knowledge of my students (not all of whom may be Catholic) never stretched to answer my question to them about whether religious ideas of the devil and evil were more similar to classicist or positivist approaches to crime.  Did we freely chose evil - calculating in the classicist way that the fun now might be worth any pain later - or were we - in a positivist medical model way - ‘infected’ by the devil.  The punishment/treatment might be the same though.

Changes in the demographics of the college’s entrants and the obviousness of Islamic dress mean that I’m now having pause for thought.  How are my religio-criminological musings and discussions of lap-dancing or rape, let-alone the significance of the Enlightenment project to sociology going down?  My commitment to that and the need for an education that challenges, nay offends, comfortable and comforting complaisance ensures I will continue to teach such material.  However, I also now drop in plenty of examples of the theocratic absurdities derived from Judaism and Christianity too and autocracies that wield similar ‘I-am-the-Law’ powers.

But this has got me thinking about my notional Saudi scholar and his problems (or her worse ones). Critical scholars in the West don’t necessarily get preferment and Government and Commerce insist on practical solutions.  So it is no surprise to see Talal Al-Eidan, described as ‘a criminology and criminal justice expert’ advising, ‘the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and banks should strengthen precautionary measures when it comes to stocking ATMs’.

Ali Wardak pointed out in 2005 how little research into crime and criminal justice there had been in Saudi Arabia.  But Dr. Robert Winslow’s A Comparative Criminology Tour of the World offers some and notes that:

In November 1990, a group of forty-seven women staged a demonstration to press their claim for the right to drive. The mutawwiin demanded that the women be punished. The government confiscated the women's passports, and those employed as teachers were fired. The previously unofficial ban on women's driving quickly became official.

And Hamid R. Kusha specifically discusses the possibility that Sharia Law deters criminality by comparing that in Iran and Sudan (but in 1998, so the changes in both those countries render comparison difficult).  Others suggest the influence of internalised specifically Islamic self-control.  Crime statistics show low but existent levels of crime.  These figures can, like all Government figures, be criticised and the low levels of crime against women subjected to particular scrutiny.  Women in post-Enlightenment countries find it hard to report partner violence so Saudi women even more so.  And violence at the hand of strangers is reduced by a segregation of the sexes that many women here would not welcome.

So we might conclude that crime is low in Saudi Arabia for a variety of reasons - religious, social, cultural, political and economy.  None of which one would want to replicate nor could we.  They have money and, until recently, isolation (Saudi Arabia builds giant Yemen border fence to keep out illegal immigrants and drug smugglers).

I’d not want to be a criminal in Saudi Arabia, nor a criminologist.  If you are one or the other let me know.  How’s it going?  What does a theocratic criminologist do all day when all the answers are in one book or in the head of one ruler?  And this was the case when Beccaria published his ‘On Crimes and Punishments’ and why initially published anonymously.

Thursday, November 08, 2012

Police and Crime Commissioners The introduction of a new species of local politician to Britain



The Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) who will be elected on 15 November represent the imposition of a significant new, American model of local politics into the British system.  I've asked
Marian FitzGerald Visiting Professor of Criminology University of Kent to do a guest blog about this.

Background

PCCs will replace the Police Authorities which were originally established in 1964 and which, at that time, comprised one third local magistrates and two thirds local councillors.  Police Authorities were responsible for maintaining an ‘efficient and effective’ police force, and could hold their Chief Constables to account on these grounds, though they were not allowed to interfere in operational matters. 
Under what was known as the Tripartite Agreement, policing policy was jointly developed by the Home Office, the Association of Chief Constables and the Association of Police Authorities. Over time, however, the role and influence of these two last bodies has diminished considerably, with that of the APA marginalised very much further, faster and sooner than that of ACPO. From the 1970s and in particular during the 1980s many left wing local authorities, frustrated at the lack of truly democratic control of the police had set up their own police committees which, while they lacked any statutory power, arguably wielded much greater political influence locally than did the police authority. Successive governments themselves also diluted the membership of the police authorities from 1994 onwards by introducing additional members appointed somewhat ad hoc by the Home Secretary, albeit notionally on the basis of representing the interests for example of the local business community. From 1997 the advent of New Labour brought increasingly centralised control of all public services which further attenuated the role of both ACPO and the already weakened APA in several ways. 

The creation under New Labour of a number of powerful new, national bodies concerned with policing (including SOCA and the NPIA) along with the proliferation of nationally driven targets and performance indicators diminished the power of Chief Constables and, with this, the status of the body representing the senior ranks. In addition, David Blunkett  as Home Secretary in particular appeared to be pursuing a strategy of  marginalising force-level hierarchies further by focusing attention at the sub-force level of the Basic Command Unit. In this context he began to cultivate the Police Superintendents’ Association (that is, the body representing BCU commanders) rather than ACPO. Inevitably these developments further constrained the notional powers of the Police Authorities and, with hindsight, the current accusations that Police Authorities had become too close to their Chief Constables, might be traced back to the two sides being brought closer together in resistance to what appeared to be a consistent attack by central government on the independence of local forces. 

At the same time, Blunkett’s ‘radical’ proposals for police reform which appeared high profile in a (singularly incoherent) white paper soon after he took office in 2001 had fallen short of meeting his personal preference for giving Home Secretaries the unambiguous right to sack Chief Constables. He had already signalled his intentions in this regard by ensuring the departure of Paul Whitehouse, Chief Constable of Sussex; but the formula in the White Paper was that the Home Secretary must nonetheless act only via the local police authority in this regard. The issue was forced to a head when, following the Bichard Inquiry into the Soham murders, Blunkett had wanted to sack the Chief Constable of Humberside (where Ian Huntley had lived and was known to the police before taking up the post as a caretaker in the Cambridgeshire school where he committed the murders) but the Police Authority opposed him. The Chief Constable was still forced ultimately to resign and the chair of the Police Authority – presumably by coincidence – was subsequently, publicly and very personally discredited.

PCCs

Role and powers
According to the Home Office website, PCCs ‘will cut crime and deliver and (sic) efficient police service’ [I suspect this is a typo, resulting from the original formulation based also on that of police authorities which, as cited above, referred to an ‘effective and efficient police service’]. While they (like police authorities) will not have the power to intervene directly in operational matters or individual cases, their capacity for cutting crime and improving police effectiveness depends on the use they make of their powers, as described in detail in the appendix. Critical among these is their power to appoint and to dismiss the chief constable.
The secretariat which previously served the Police Authority transfers to support the PCC. The secretariat is paid for out of the police budget (which comprises the grant from central government and from local tax in the form of the police precept). The PCC’s salary will be funded separately by the Home Office and varies according to the size of the police force – ranging from £100,000 in the largest forces (West Midlands, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire) down to £65,000 in the four smallest forces (which include Warwickshire and Gloucestershire); but in the bulk of forces the pay is £85,000.
The term of office for a PCC will be four years and the initial proposal to limit the number of times PCCs can stand for re-election has been dropped. Even had it been retained, all PCCs would have been eligible to stand for re-election at least once; but now they can fight to stay in office as often as they choose.

Eligibility
The Mayor of London has already been given the powers of a PCC by the government and the Mayor’s Office for Policing has replaced the Metropolitan Police Authority. I assume that his powers cover not only the Met but also the tiny City of London police force. So the following apply to the other 41 forces in England Wales.
Candidates must be ‘British, Commonwealth or EU citizens’ aged over 18 who are registered to vote in their force area. Exceptions are individuals who have ever been convicted of an imprisonable offence and individuals who are currently engaged in any of the following occupations:
civil servant, judge, police officer, member of the regular armed forces, employee of a council within the force area, employee of a police related agency, employee of another government agency, politically restricted post-holder, member of police staff (including PCSOs) or member of a police authority.
Any MP or MEP wishing to stand must first resign their seat. To be accepted as a candidate requires the endorsement of at least 100 local electors and all candidates have to put up a deposit of £5,000 which they will lose if they fail to get 5 per cent of the votes cast.
Accountability
The Home Office website stresses that the PCCs are accountable only to their local electorate, although many of the briefings for candidates remind them of a number of national priorities they must bear in mind when taking local decisions, as well as a range of inspectorates and other national bodies with oversight of policing to which their decision-making will (by inference) be subject.
Locally, however, they are directly accountable to no-one, including the Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) which have also been set up by the legislation. 
The PCPs have no direct power over the PCC and (with the two exceptions referred to below) any decision made by the PCC does not require reference to the PCP, still less depend on their support. The PCPs will comprise
at least one representative from each local authority in the force area, with a minimum of 10 councillors and 2 co-opted independent members, and a maximum total membership of 20.

A full description of their intended role is also included in the appendix. Note that the only powers of veto the panels can exercise are with regard to the setting of the police precept and the appointment (but, apparently, not the dismissal) of a Chief Constable, though in both cases a two thirds panel majority is required.
While the secretariat which supported the Police Authority transfers to the PCC who replaces the Authority, there would be an obvious conflict of interest were the same secretariat also to serve the panels. So a parallel arrangement is needed for this purpose and, according to the Home Office website, it will provide
£53,300 funding for each panel each year to cover support and running costs. Expenses of up to £920 will also be available to each member.

 Who is standing?
The initial Green Paper placed considerable emphasis on the notion that the post of PCC was open to any individual citizen who met the criteria above. Yet it seemed obvious from the outset that
a    only the more affluent independent individuals could afford to fund their own campaigns and, additionally, take the risk of losing a £5,000 deposit (which, as has been noted by various commentators, is ten times that required to stand for parliament) but     even so, anyone lacking access to the organisational resources of an established political party would be at a considerable disadvantage, given that the electorate they would need to reach extends over several parliamentary constituencies in many cases. (Greater Manchester, for example, returns 27 MPs).

While responses to the consultation have never been published, many are known to have expressed the concerns covered in the following section and some of these have been reflected in the finalised arrangements for PCCs and PCPs. With regard to the specific concern that the successful candidates would predominantly represent political parties, a proviso has now been made that each should, on appointment, take an ‘oath of independence’.

The list of confirmed candidates on 26 October was published by the Home Office and shows whether they had any party affiliation. The breakdown was as follows:
Con
41
Lab
41
Lib Dem
24
UKIP
24
Green
1
EDL/English Democrat
6
Independent
55









Concerns

As noted above, widespread concerns are known to have been expressed in response to the Green Paper, although these have never been published; and there was strong parliamentary resistance to the legislation – especially in the \House Lords. The concerns fall broadly under two headings but there are important links between the first and the second.

Democratic legitimacy
The anticipated turnout in these elections is under 20 per cent. But this is unlikely to be evenly spread across the population which is eligible to vote: it is likely to be skewed by area, age and SES. That is, it will be higher in more middle class areas; and younger people – that is, those aged 18-24 - will be under-represented among voters (while anyone aged under 18, of course, isn’t eligible to vote anyway).
All of the posts will be contested, although there is a wide variation in the numbers of candidates and this appears unrelated to the size of the force area. Most have at least four candidates and Devon and Cornwall holds the record with 10. Regardless of the turnout, therefore, the vote will be split. The system to be used will give voters a first and second preference, with the preferences taken into account if no candidate initially secures more than 50 per cent of the ballot. So, if the predictions of turnout are correct, candidates may be successful on the basis of securing the support of no more than 11 per cent of the electorate.
 Importantly, these posts will endow a single individual with democratic legitimacy without them thereby taking their place among peers who have been elected on the same basis and on whose votes they are therefore dependent if they are to secure support for their policies. These checks and balances on the power of individual elected representatives have long been the basis of British democracy (albeit the introduction of elected mayors has already broken with this tradition) and is a key characteristics of parliamentary democracy. Hence, for example, when Tony Blair as Prime Minister got Cabinet backing for the invasion of Iraq, he nonetheless faced the challenge of securing a parliamentary majority.

Politicisation and skewing of police resources
Any fan of The Wire will be only too well aware of the problems which can arise when an elected office holder who has the power to hire and fire their local police chief wishes to use that position to boost their electoral position, especially when they are running for re-election. Where – as will increasingly be the case – the current police chief is the office holder’s appointee and/or is closely identified with them, further problems may arise if the election is won by a rival in whose eyes the police chief may de facto be suspect from the outset.

Against this background, specific areas of concern with regard to the way in which PCCs in England and Wales are likely to use their powers are as follows.
To maintain and build on their electoral base, the PCCs will need above all to be responsive to the concerns of a small minority of the local electorate which, in turn, represents a very much smaller proportion of the population overall. Yet those sections of the population overall which will be of little interest to the PCC (since they are either disenfranchised or much less certain to vote) will include those who are most directly affected by crime and policing – in particular young people and those living in the most deprived areas where crime tends to be highest and problems of violence are particularly serious.

In some parts of a force area the PCC may have few or even no supporters; but in many there will be a mix of the enfranchised (a minority of whom will have voted for the PCC) and the disenfranchised – whether simply in terms of the age divide or because (for example in ‘gentrified’ areas) there is a close juxtaposition of the affluent and the relatively poor. In these situations, the pressure on the PCC from their electoral base is likely to result in pressures to co-opt the police against the young or the less affluent simply because they are perceived as a threat by the PCCs’ supporters.

Only about a fifth of the population is likely to be a victim of crime in any given year and (see above) victims are over-represented among the disenfranchised and in the areas where electoral turnout is likely to be lowest. So the main demands on the PCCs from their core constituency seem likely to relate to low level crime and disorder, especially antisocial behaviour and to maintaining the visible police presence which they have become accustomed to since the national roll-out of Safer Neighbourhood Teams in around 2004. It should be pointed out here that the term ‘antisocial behaviour’ is a subjective concept and that behaviour which might be deemed antisocial in lower crime, more affluent areas may, in more deprived, high crime areas be unremarkable. In  the more deprived, high crime areas  also, what does nonetheless count as anti-social behaviour (such as street prostitution and drug dealing) may still be more likely to go unreported since, as with crime more generally, local people may be more reluctant to go to the police for a variety of reasons, including the fear of reprisals.

Yet police numbers have already been falling for several years and ongoing cuts to police budgets make it almost certain that this will continue, while civilian staff are shed at an even faster rate.  This suggests that pressures to maintain police visibility and to increase the resources committed to low level crime and antisocial behaviour will inevitably detract from    the policing of areas where crime is more serious and also  police activities which are essential but of which the public in general will be far less aware.
With regard to a) not only is the crime experienced by local residents more prevalent and more serious in the more deprived areas of the force, the main crime hotspots are always town and city centres where de facto the resident population tends to be small and where, in any case, many victims of crime may not be local residents.
With regard to b) the loss of civilian staff may be seen politically as more acceptable than a drastic fall in police numbers but this element of the police workforce had also increased rapidly in recent years as officer posts were civilianised precisely to free up officers to perform their warranted tasks. Increasingly civilians have not only provided the necessary administrative back-up for the visible side of the business, they, along with officer colleagues have performed specialist tasks to improve both the prevention and detection of crime – for example through improved crime pattern analysis and provision of forensic support. Yet if officers cannot be spared to maintain and improve these functions because of the need to maintain visibility, this must surely have an impact on the ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ of the service sooner or later.
Finally, at a much more general level, even without these very real concerns about the day-to-day impact of the PCCs on the delivery of policing in their particular force area as they try to meet the demands of their narrow electoral base, it seems inevitable that successful candidates belonging to the Labour party (and other non-Coalition backed PCCs, including any representing UKIP) will use this very significant power base to score political points off the government. In this sense also, local policing may be caught in political crossfire in a way which is unprecedented and with consequences which, while unpredictable, may nonetheless be undesirable to anyone who would maintain the principle that the police should remain above party politics.

Final comments

Three very disparate and personal reflections are as follows.
The present government appears determined to continue the trend of taking public services out of the frame of democratic accountability through privatisation and arms’ length commissioning or contracting out. The rush to increase the academies programme and establish free schools in particular seems designed to marginalise the role of local authorities in a way which (along with cuts to the funding of other services) hollows out the role of local democratically elected representatives to an unprecedented degree. It therefore seems ironic – to put it no higher – that the government should set such store on the importance of ensuring that the police service becomes democratically accountable at local level. The irony is compounded by the additional cost involved at a time when government funding is increasingly being cut back in the name of reducing the deficit.

In future any minister may need to think twice before questioning a trade union’s mandate for industrial action on the grounds that only a minority of its members voted.  

It will be interesting to see how the PCCs (and the government as evidence of the importance of its having imposed them) try to claim success in terms of having reduced crime when, officially, crime recorded by the police has been going down anyway since 2002-3. Despite the recession – and to the perplexity of many commentators - the results published on 18 October 2012 suggest that it is steadily continuing to fall.